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Abstract 
Linkages between the regulated and unregulated dairy markets in Kenya were examined using an 
econometric model of the fluid milk intake for eight processing plants. Counter-intuitive results 
were obtained: an increase in the regulated price was significant in decreasing intake in the regu­
lated market, indicating that a price increase in the regulated market also increased price and 
quantity supplied in the unregulated market. Lagged rainfall was a proxy for available feed and 
was highly significant in explaining milk intake in the regulated market. 
Introduction 
Regulated prices for agricultural products are prevalent in both centrally 
planned and market economies. The decision makers who set the prices at­
tempt to set them high enough to encourage producers to maintain an adequate 
and stable supply, and yet not so high that inefficient production is encour­
aged. They must also be aware of equity principles in that producers should 
not benefit at the expense of consumers (Mansell et al., 1984). This balancing 
act between objectives is difficult and even more so in less developed countries 
that have interaction between the formal, regulated market, and the informal, 
unregulated market. Pricing policies may have an effect opposite of what is 
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expected if the interaction between the two markets is overlooked or the 
strength of the unregulated market is underestimated. Thus, it is important to 
determine the relationship between the regulated and unregulated markets if 
government intervention in agricultural markets is to have its desired results. 
This paper disusses an estimated supply response model for the regulated 
fluid milk market in Kenya. This model has counter-intuitive results that can 
be explained by the existence of a strong unregulated market that is driven by 
the regulated market and exogenous factors. While this model does not explic­
itly estimate the relationship between the regulated and unregulated markets, 
it does allow testing the hypothesis that an increase in a regulated price may 
actually decrease supply in the regulated market. 
A short history of dairying in Kenya follows. A description of the theory 
underlying the model used in this study is next. The empirical model and data 
used, including the use of rainfall data as a significant proxy for available feed, 
is then discussed, followed by a summary and conclusions at the end of the 
paper. 
Dairying in Kenya 
Dairying has been part of Kenyan agriculture for generations, but commer­
cial dairying with high-yielding European breeds was started by Europeans 
around 1912. A strong effective demand encouraged expansion of the dairy 
industry. The depression of the 1930's disrupted the dairy industry and led to 
the amalgamation of several small creameries into the Kenyan Cooperatives 
Creamery (KCC) (Ruigu, 1978). The KCC is supplied by large commercial 
dairies and cooperatives that each market the milk of about 200 smallholders 
(Von Stotz, 1979). Increased milk production in Kenya over the last 20 years 
has come in a large part from the smallholders, who produced an estimated 
70% of the milk in Kenya in 1975, but accounted for only 37% of the deliveries 
to the KCC in that year (Minae, 1981). Smallholder deliveries to the KCC 
have been increasing, reaching 54% in 1982, and their production and deliv­
eries to the KCC are expected to increase in both absolute terms and as a 
percentage of total production and deliveries (Kenya Central Bureau of Sta­
tistics, 1970-1983). 
More than 60% of the smallholders in Kenya own at least one dairy cow. 
Milk production is primarily for home consumption, with any surplus mar­
keted to the KCC through a local cooperative or 'over the fence' in the unre­
gulated market. Cooperative and transportion fees make the price smallholders 
realize from sales to the KCC through the cooperatives less than the regulated 
KCC price that is paid to the large producers. The cooperative payments are 
also often delayed (Minae, 1981). 
The smallholders do not purchase many inputs and so rely heavily on avail­
able feedstuffs, which in turn are dependent on rainfall. Even with several 
different ecological zones in the country, there is a definite dry season in Jan­
uary through April. The dry season severely limits available feedstuffs and 
results in a reduced supply of milk. The KCC has tried different methods to 
encourage a stable supply through the dry season, with a dry season bonus 25% 
above the regular price of milk the latest incentive. 
Interaction between regulated and unregulated markets 
Suppose there is an unregulated market that has a constant downward slop­
ing demand curve, an upward sloping supply curve that has periodic exoge­
nously caused changes in supply, and an adjoining but separate regulated market 
that will buy all output offered a price P n as shown in Fig. 1. If supply is 8 1, 
then unregulated price is Puand total production Qu is sold on the unregulated 
market. If there is an exogenous change in supply to 8 2 the regulated price, P n 
acts as a price floor for the producers. Qu is sold in the unregulated market, and 
the amount sold to the regulated market is Qr = Qt - Qu. This graphical model 
is analogous to Kenyan milk supply in the dry (8 1 ) and wet (8 2 ) seasons. 
The regulated market will buy all output at the regulated price, so P r acts as 
a price floor for PUl or: 
(1) 
where Z are other factors in the local unregulated market, such as distance to 
the regulated market, local demand, and exogenous factors affecting supply in 
the unregulated market. P r does not act as a price ceiling in the unregulated 
market: there are positive marketing costs of the final product which act as a 
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Fig, L Quanitity supplied when the regulated price acts as a price floor, 
barrier between the regulated and unregulated markets. Thus, Pu increases 
with P" distance to the regulated market and local demand, and decreases with 
exogenous supply increases. 
Supply on the regulated market is: 
(2) 
where X is other factors including exogenous supply shifters. 
The response of a price change in the regulated market can be two-fold: 
(3) 
The first term on the right-hand side is positive and the second term is neg­
ative. Elasticizing (3): 
(4) 
Given the long production cycle in dairy, i.e., a decision about production today 
will result in an increase or decrease in milk supply 9 months from now, a very 
inelastic supply is expected, as found in most countries (e.g., Dahlgran, 1985). 
Hence, the first term on the right-hand side, the partial elasticity of quantity 
in the regulated market with respect to regulated price, is expected to be posi­
tive and very small. One can reasonably expect any increase in the regulated 
price to have an immediate effect on the unregulated price, so the last term is 
positive and close to 1. Thus, the impact of an increase in the regulated price 
on supply in the regulated market is determined by the relationship between 
the partial elasticities of quantity in the regulated market with respect to reg­
ulated and unregulated prices. If IEQ,p, I < IEQ,Pu I, then an increase in the reg­
ulated price will have the opposite effect; i.e., the quantity supplied to the 
regulated market will decrease with an increase in the regulated price. 
Empirical model 
The above model appears to be substantiated by results of an econometric 
estimation of supply in the regulated fluid milk market in Kenya. The regu­
lated fluid milk market in Kenya is the KCC, which is a government-regulated 
monopoly/monopsony. The unregulated market consists of many smallhold­
ers who sell any milk surplus to family needs 'over the fence'. 
Supply to the regulated market was approximated as intake for eight KCC 
processing plants that account for 98% of total KCC intake. Table 1 lists the 
plants along with average intake and percentage oftotal intake for 1970 - 1980. 
Monthly intake for these plants was estimated as: 
Qr= P r + RFMA(4) + DPR+ DS+ T (5) 
TABLE 1 
Average KCC intake by factory, and nearest recorded rainfall station, 1970-1980 
Factory" Average Percentage Rainfall 
intake of total station 
(106 litres) intake 
Eldoret 48.03 21 Eldoret 
Kiganjo 24.68 11 Nyeri 
Kitale 29.17 13 Kitale 
Nairobi 24.59 11 Kiambu 
Naivasha 23.87 11 Nakuru 
Nakuru 49.05 22 Nakuru 
Nyahururu 13.44 6 Nyahururu 
Sotik 11.04 5 Kerichoo 
aThese eight factories account for 98% of KCC's intake. Left out are Kisumu, Mombasa (Kilifi), 
Mariakani, and Molo. 
where P r is the real regulated price for fluid milk, RFMA (4) 4-month moving 
average of rainfall, DPR a discrete variable indicating a nominal change in the 
KCC price for fluid milk, DB is a binary variable to indicate the dry season, and 
a trend variable, T, was included to capture disembodied technical change. 
The KCC price for fluid milk was deflated by the index of prices paid for con­
sumer goods in rural areas to approximate the real price smallholders received 
for their milk. The discrete variable indicating a nominal price change, DPR, 
attempts to capture the affect a nominal change in the regulated price has on 
the unregulated price. The trend variable, T, tries to capture disembodied tech­
nical change including genetic improvement, improved management practices, 
and increased educational level of the producers. 
Rainfall was used as a proxy for available feed. Smallholders do not purchase 
many inputs, if any, and so livestock feed is limited to whatever is available. 
Rainfall was modeled both lagged and as a moving average over various time 
periods to capture the effect that rain in period t has on feed availability in 
period t+. Using a minimum distance criterion as approximated by a chi-square 
(Judge et al., 1982), a 4-month moving average was chosen to model rainfall. 
Data 
Monthly quantities of intake per plant were made available by the KCC. 
Price paid by the KCC, the index of prices paid in rural areas, and monthly 
rainfall for seven weather stations closest to the KCC plants came from the 
Statistical Abstract for Kenya (Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 1970-1983). 
TABLE 2 
Estimated KCC intake by plant, 1970-1982 
Plant Intercept P, RFMA(4) DPR DS T 
Eldoret 972.7 2425 17.72*** -801.0*** 229.8 22.85*** 
R"=0.58 (623.0 )a (1038.81 ) (1.50 ) (160.8) (159.1 ) (6.53 ) 
Kiganjo 1048 3062** -6.66* -19.13 -135.2 03.16 
R"=0.44 (742.2) (633.6 ) (1.59 ) (91.91 ) (108.0 ) (3.82) 
Kitale 3688** -3623** 10.93** -26.50 -233.56 -1.10 
R"=0.73 (695.6 ) (483.8 ) (1.06 ) (19.60 ) (98.82 ) (85.21 ) 
Nairobi 2586 -1151 4.77** -518.3** -144.0 9.25* 
R"=0.72 (1006 ) (405.8 ) (0.5624 ) (59.67 ) (59.36 ) (2.39) 
Naivasha 1514 -620.2 15.66*** -441.8** -257.89* 18.04** 
R"=0.52 (987.6 ) (624.34 ) (0.89) (66.24) (72.22 ) (2.64 ) 
Nyahururu 1328** 2087* 4.81** - 83.49) -220.85 15.89** 
R:2=0.70 (232.1 ) (463.7) (0.80) (69.09) (80.97 ) (2.79) 
Sotik -259.6 625.8 0.84 25.24 -84.21 11.01* 
R"=0.73 (279.4 ) (354.0 ) (0.54 ) (53.19) (58.26 ) (2.15) 
Nakuru 3431 -472.1 10.13*** -472.1** -776.4** 14.46* 
R"=0.70 (2112) (135.7) (0.80 ) (69.09 ) (80.97) (2.79 ) 
aStandard errors of the estimate are in parenthese.
 
Significant at the O.Ollevel***.
 
Significant at the 0.05 level**.
 
Significant at the 0.10 level*.
 
Results and discussion 
Equation (4) was appended with an error term to account for unobserved 
stochastic variables and estimated for the eight KCC plants for 1970 - 1982. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. The explanatory power of the 
model ranges from explaining 44 to 73% of the variation in the reported KCC 
intake. Durbin-Watson tests for autocorrelation were inconclusive. 
The coefficient of Pr was negative in half the models, and significant in only 
three of the models, indicating that real price was not a very important factor 
in KCC intake. Studies in the U.S.A. have also found the price of milk in a 
supply function to be not significant (Wilson and Thompson, 1967; Prato, 
1973 ). 
The coefficient ofDPR is negative in all eight models and significant in four. 
The hypothesis that an increase in a regulated price may decrease supply in 
the regulated market is not rejected by these results: a nominal increase in the 
KCC price of milk resulted in decreased deliveries to the KCC. A linkage be­
tween the regulated and unregulated markets exists, with price increases in the 
regulated market being passed through to the unregulated market. The higher 
unregulated price then attracts more milk to 'over the fence' sales and de­
creases deliveries to the KCC. 
The coefficient of RFMA (4) was positive, as one would expect, and signifi­
cant in six of the models, and negative (and significant) in only one. Rainfall 
appears to be a good proxy for available feedstuffs in Kenya. Rainfall may not 
be as important in more developed countries where producers purchase most 
of their inputs, but in areas where few inputs are purchased rainfall is likely 
an important variable in supply studies. The importance of weather in KCC 
milk intake is reinforced by the coefficient of DS, which is negative in all eight 
models, though significant in only two, and indicates a definite decrease of 
supply in the dry season 
The existence of disembodied technical change is supported by positive and 
significant trend variables in six of the models. The two trend parameters that 
are negative are also not significant. 
The counter-intuitive result on nominal price increase has implications for 
policy makers in many less-developed countries. Price policies to increase sup­
ply to the regulated markets may produce results opposite of those desired. If 
there is a linkage between the regulated and unregulated markets such that an 
increase in the regulated price also raises the unregulated price, the increased 
prices may bid output to the unregulated markets and away from the regulated 
markets. Thus, raising the KCC price may cause more 'over the fence' sales 
and less KCC intake. 
These results are for only one commodity in one country, but they do point 
out that if a government elects to intervene in a market, the results of that 
intervention may be opposite of what is expected or desired. This study points 
out that there is a need for further research into the interaction between reg­
ulated and unregulated markets in less-developed countries. Without an un­
derstanding of such a relationship intervention in a market may bring about 
results opposite of what was planned. 
Summary 
The hypothesis that an increase in a regulated price may decrease supply in 
the regulated market is supported by these results. A nominal increase in the 
KCC price of milk resulted in decreased deliveries to the KCC. The decreased 
deliveries indicate a linkage between the regulated and unregulated markets 
that is driven by the regulated price. The results also indicate that rainfall can 
be used as proxy for available feeds where feed inputs are not purchased. This 
study points out that there is a need for governments to determine the rela­
tionship between regulated and unregulated markets to reduce the risk that 
pricing policies will bring about results opposite of those planned and desired. 
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